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The assumption that a complete description of an early state of the universe does not 
privilege any position or direction in space leads to a unified account of probability in 
cosmology, macroscopic physics, and quantum mechanics.  Such a description has a 
statistical character.  Deterministic laws link it to statistical descriptions of the cosmic 
medium at later times, and because these laws do not privilege any position or 
direction in space, the same must be true of these descriptions.  If the universe is 
infinite, we can identify the probability that the energy density at a particular instant 
and a particular point in space (relative to a system of spacetime coordinates in which 
the postulated spatial symmetries are manifest) lies in a given range with the 
fractional volume occupied by points where the energy density lies in this range; and 
similarly with all other probabilities that figure in the statistical description.  The 
probabilities that figure in a complete description of the cosmic medium at any given 
moment thus have an exact and objective physical interpretation.  The statistical 
entropy and the information associated with each cosmological probability 
distribution are likewise objective properties of the universe, defined in terms of 
relative frequencies or spatial averages.   
 
The initial states of macroscopic systems are characterized by probability 
distributions of microstates, linked by a deterministic historical account to probability 
distributions that characterize the early universe.  The probability distributions that 
characterize the initial states of macroscopic systems are usually deficient in 
particular kinds of microscopic information -- though the history of a macroscopic 
system may include an experimental intervention that creates a hidden form of 
microscopic information, as in Hahn‟s spin-echo experiment.  These general 
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conclusions clarify the relation between quantum mechanics and quantum statistical 
mechanics.  A macroscopic system‟s history determines the statistical ensembles that 
represent its macrostates and, absent experimental interventions that produce hidden 
microscopic order, justifies what van Kampen has called the “repeated randomness 
assumptions” needed to derive master equations and H theorems.   
 
I give a schematic account of quantum measurement that combines von Neumann‟s 
definition of an ideal measurement and his account of “premeasurements” with the 
conclusion that the initial state of a measuring apparatus is fully characterized by a 
historically determined probability distribution of microstates that is deficient in 
microscopic information.  To comply with the postulated requirement that physical 
descriptions must not privilege our (or any other) position, I interpret the post-
measurement probability distribution of quantum states of the combined system as 
describing the state of an ensemble of identical measuring experiments uniformly 
scattered throughout the universe.  The resulting account predicts (there is no need to 
invoke von Neumann‟s collapse postulate) that each apparatus in the cosmological 
ensemble registers a definite outcome and leaves the quantum system in the 
corresponding eigenstate of the measured quantity.  Because the present account 
conflates the indeterminacy of measurement outcomes with the indeterminacy of the 
combined system‟s position, it reconciles the indeterminacy of quantum measurement 
outcomes with the deterministic character of Einstein‟s field equations, thereby 
invalidating a standard argument for the need to quantize general relativity.  A more 
detailed account of measurement would allow for the effects of decoherence, but as 
Joos and Zeh, Schlosshauer, and others have emphasized, decoherence theory alone 
does not explain why quantum measurements have definite outcomes.   
 
Finally, because the initial states of actual macroscopic systems may be objectively 
deficient in certain kinds of microscopic information, macroscopic processes that are 
sensitive to initial conditions may have objectively indeterminate outcomes.  In such 
processes, as in quantum measurements, a probability distribution that defines a 
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single initial macrostate may evolve (deterministically) into a probability distribution 
that assigns finite probabilities to two or more macrostates.  Examples include chaotic 
orbits in celestial mechanics, evolving weather systems, and processes that generate 
diversity in such biological processes as biological evolution and the immune 
response.   
  
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 02.50.-r, 5.30.-d 
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  I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Initial conditions characterize systems to which given physical laws apply and the 
conditions under which they apply.  Wigner [1] has suggested that a “minimal set of 
initial conditions not only does not permit any exact relations between its elements; on 
the contrary, there is reason to contend that these are, or at some time have been, as 
random as the externally imposed gross constraints allow.”  As an illustration of such 
initial conditions, he cites a version of Laplace‟s nebular hypothesis, in which a 
structureless, spinning gas cloud evolves into a collection of planets revolving in the 
same sense around a central star in nearly circular, nearly coplanar orbits.  The gross 
constraints in this example include the cloud‟s initial mass, angular momentum, and 
chemical composition.  “More generally [Wigner writes], one tries to deduce almost all 
„organized motion,‟ even the existence of life, in a similar fashion.”  This paper seeks to 
ground this view of initial conditions in a historical account that links the initial 
conditions that characterize physical systems and their environments to the initial 
conditions that characterize a statistically uniform and isotropic model of the universe at 
a time shortly after the beginning of the cosmic expansion.   
 In such a universe, particle reaction rates exceed the cosmic expansion rate at 
sufficiently early times [2].  Consequently, local thermal equilibrium prevails at the 
instantaneous and rapidly changing values of temperature and mass density.  Suppose 
that there is a system of spacetime coordinates relative to which no statistical property of 
the cosmic medium defines a preferred position or direction.  Then the values of a small 
number of physical parameters, notably the photon-baryon and lepton-baryon ratios [3], 
suffice to determine the state of the cosmic medium at early times.  This paper explores 
some consequences of the assumption that this characterization of the early cosmic 
medium is exact and complete – that it contains only statistical information and is 
invariant under spatial translations and rotations.  For example, a uniform, unbounded 
distribution of elementary particles in thermal equilibrium is completely characterized by 
its temperature and mass density.   
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 The following discussion does not seek to extend quantum mechanics or general 
relativity beyond their current domains of validity.  Rather, it seeks to show how these 
domains merge smoothly with the macroscopic domain of statistical physics.  I argue that 
macroscopic systems that interact sufficiently weakly with their surroundings can be 
assigned definite macrostates characterized by probability distributions of microstates 
that have evolved from probability distributions that characterized the cosmic medium 
early on.  By virtue of a strong version of the cosmological principle, discussed in the 
next section, these probability distributions represent objective indeterminacy rather than 
ignorance.  The same strong version of the cosmological principle requires one to 
interpret the classical fields that figure in relativistic cosmology as random fields, just as 
in the theory of homogeneous turbulence (except that in the cosmological context the 
probability distributions that characterize the random fields represent objective 
indeterminacy).  I will argue (in section III.E) that this way of indirectly linking quantum 
mechanics to general relativity enables one to circumvent a standard argument for the 
need to quantize gravity.  Because the argument in section III.E assumes conditions in 
which quantum mechanics and relativistic cosmology are both valid, it doesn‟t bear 
directly on the need for a theory that applies under more extreme conditions (the very 
early universe, black holes).   On the other hand, an account of initial conditions that 
serves to reconcile quantum mechanics and general relativity under present conditions 
could conceivably prove to be relevant to the much larger project of unifying the two 
theories.    
 
 
  II.  THE STRONG COSMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE 
 
The cosmological principle states that there exists a system of spacetime coordinates 
relative to which no statistical property of the physical universe defines a preferred 
position or direction in space.  It embraces Hubble‟s “principle of uniformity,” which 
applies to the observable distribution of galaxies, and Einstein‟s model of the universe as 
a uniform, unbounded distribution of dust [35].  Like the assumptions that define 
idealized models of stars and galaxies, it has usually been viewed as a convenient 
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simplification.  Unlike those assumptions, however, the cosmological principle could 
hold exactly. I will refer to the hypothesis that it does hold exactly as the strong 
cosmological principle [4], [5].  It draws support from the following considerations. 
 First, precise and extensive observations of the cosmic microwave background and of 
the spatial distribution and line-of-sight velocities of galaxies have so far produced no 
evidence of deviations from statistical homogeneity and isotropy.  Astronomical 
observations provide no positive support for the view that the cosmological principle is 
merely an approximation or an idealization, like the initial conditions that define models 
of stars and galaxies. 
 Second, the initial conditions that define the universe do not have the same function 
as those that define models of astronomical systems.  A theory of stellar structure must 
apply to a range of stellar models because stars have a wide range of masses, chemical 
compositions, spins, and ages.  No analogous requirement obtains for models of the 
universe.  
 Finally, general relativity predicts that local reference frames that are unaccelerated 
relative to the cosmological coordinate system defined by the cosmological principle are 
inertial [4].  Astronomical evidence supports this prediction.  It indicates that local 
inertial reference frames are indeed unaccelerated relative to a coordinate system in 
which the cosmic microwave background is equally bright, on average, in all directions 
and in which the spatial distribution of galaxies is statistically homogeneous and 
isotropic.  If the distribution of energy and momentum on cosmological scales were not 
statistically homogeneous and isotropic, there would be no preferred cosmological frame 
and hence no obvious explanation for the observed relation between local inertial frames 
and the frame defined by the cosmic microwave background and the spatial distribution 
and line-of-sight velocities of galaxies. 
  Cosmological models that conform to the cosmological principle are characterized 
by parameters, such as the photon-to-baryon and lepton-baryon ratios, the curvature 
scale, and the cosmological constant.  Some theories for the origin of structure also posit 
primordial density fluctuations whose spectrum and amplitude are characterized by 
parameters that do not privilege particular spatial positions or directions.  Because current 
physical laws have translational and rotational spatial symmetry (relative to a 
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cosmological coordinate system in which the description of the cosmic medium is 
invariant under spatial translations and rotations or relative to a local inertial coordinate 
system), the strong cosmological principle follows from the assumption that a model that 
has these symmetries completely describes the early universe at a single moment of time.   
 The strong cosmological principle is inconsistent with classical microphysics.  In a 
uniform, unbounded, infinite distribution of classical particles, every particle is uniquely 
situated with respect to its neighbors, or even with respect to its nearest neighbor, because 
the number of pairs of nearest neighbors is countably infinite whereas the number of 
possible (real) values of the ratio between two nearest-neighbor separations is 
uncountably infinite.  By contrast, a complete quantum description of a uniform, 
unbounded distribution of non-interacting particles specifies a number density and a set 
of single-particle occupation numbers for each kind of particle.  The following discussion 
will bring to light other links between cosmology and quantum physics. 
 
 
  A. Statistical cosmology 
 
Non-uniform cosmological models that conform to the strong cosmological principle 
represent the distribution of mass, temperature, chemical composition, and other 
macroscopic variables by random functions of position.  Each random function is 
characterized by an infinite set of probability distributions each of which is invariant 
under spatial translations and rotations.  For example, the spatial distribution of mass at a 
particular moment is specified by the probability distribution of the mass density at a 
single point, the joint-probability distribution of the mass densities at two given points, 
the joint-probability distribution of the mass densities at three given points, and so on.  
The probability distribution of the mass density at the point x  (x1, x2 , x3)  is independent 
of x:  
 
  Pr{a  (x)  a  da}  p(a)da , (1) 
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where p(a)da , the probability that the mass density lies in the interval (a,a  da) , is the 
same at all points.  Similarly, the joint-probability distribution of the mass densities at 
two distinct points,  
 
  Pr{a  (x1)  a  da,b  (x2 )  b  db}  p(a,b; x1  x2 )dadb , (2) 
 
depends only on the distance x1  x2  between the points but not on the direction of the 
vector joining them, and so on. 
 The probabilities that figure in a description that conforms to the strong cosmological 
principle can be defined in terms of spatial averages.  For example, Pr{a  (x)  a  da}  
is the mean, or spatial average, of the function  
 
   ((x);a,a  da)  1 if  (a,a  da)
0 otherwise        
. (3) 
 
That is, the probability that the mass density at a given point lies in a given interval is the 
fractional volume (defined below) occupied by points at which the mass density satisfies 
this condition.  Similarly, the joint probability that the mass densities at two points x, 
x + y lie in given intervals is the fractional volume occupied by points x at which this 
condition, with y fixed, is satisfied; and so on.   
 More generally, let I denote a function that, like   in (3), takes the value 1 at points 
where a given condition is satisfied and takes the value 0 at points where the condition is 
not satisfied.  The probability that the condition is satisfied is the spatial average of I, or 
fractional volume of the (infinite) region occupied by points where the condition is 
satisfied.  To define this spatial average, let v(V) denote the integral of I over a region of 
volume V.  If the ratio v(V)/V approaches a limit as V increases indefinitely and if this 
limit doesn‟t depend on the shape or location of the regions that figure in the definition, 
we define it as the spatial average of I.   
 In more detail, assuming for simplicity that space is Euclidean, consider a hierarchy 
of progressively coarser Cartesian grids.  Let Ck
(n )
 denote the kth cell belonging to the 
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grid of level n; k is an integer.  The members of a cell belonging to level 0 of the 
hierarchy of grids are points in space.  The members of cells belonging to level n1are 
cells of level n, and each cell of level n1  contains 27 cells of level n and is centered on 
one of them.  Let I(n,k)  denote the average value of I in cell Ck
(n ) .  Let  n  denote the 
least upper bound of the absolute value of the differences I(n,k) I(n, k )

  for all pairs 
k, k  and a fixed n.  We now stipulate that n  0  as n  .  Then the I(n,k)  for a 
given n approach a common limit as n  , which we identify with the spatial average 
of I.  We take the stipulation that n  0  as n   to be part of the definition of 
statistical homogeneity.    
 If we identify point sets in space (at a given moment in cosmic time) with events in a 
sample space, and define the probability of an event as the fractional volume of the set of 
points where a specified condition is satisfied, the axioms of probability theory become 
true statements about point sets in physical space at a given moment of cosmic time, 
provided our description of the cosmic medium satisfies the strong cosmological 
principle (now taken to include the preceding stipulation about spatial averages).  Thus 
the present definition of probability provides a model of axiomatic probability theory.  
The model goes beyond the axiomatic definition because it captures the intuitive notion 
of indeterminacy associated with probability.  For example, the mass density at a given 
point is objectively indeterminate, because a complete description of the cosmic medium 
that complies with the strong cosmological principle doesn‟t contain the value of the 
mass density at that point.   
 It is instructive to compare the present definition of probability with the definitions 
that figure in standard accounts of kinetic theory and statistical mechanics.  Maxwell and 
Boltzmann assumed that every molecule in a finite sample of an ideal gas is in a definite 
but unknown molecular state.  They identified the probability of a molecular state with 
the fraction of molecules in that state.  Gibbs [6] represented the macroscopic states of a 
system in thermodynamic equilibrium by probability distributions of (classical) 
microstates.  He identified the probability of a range of microstates with the relative 
frequency of that range in an ensemble, a collection of imaginary replicas of the system, 
each in a definite microstate.  But he did not – as some later authors have done – assume 
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that the macroscopic system in a macrostate characterized by a probability distribution of 
microstates was actually in one of these microstates.  As discussed below, the present 
approach, like Gibbs‟s, characterizes macrostates by probability distributions of 
microstates, and it does not assume that the system is in one of these microstates.  On the 
contrary, the probability distribution that characterizes a macrostate characterizes it 
completely.   
 
 
  1.  Statistical entropy  
 
In a probabilistic description of the cosmic medium, statistical entropy provides an 
objective (and, as Shannon showed) essentially unique measure of randomness.  The 
statistical entropy S of a discrete probability distribution pi  is given by [7]: 
 
  S pi    pi
i
 log pi . (4) 
 
Shannon proved that the three following properties of the function S define it uniquely.  
(i) S is non-negative and vanishes only when one of the pi  is equal to 1.  (ii) S takes its 
largest value, log n, just in case there are n non-vanishing probabilities pi , each equal to 
1/n.  (iii) S is hierarchically decomposable, in the sense defined by (7) below.  The last 
property plays a key role in the following discussion.  To derive (7) from (4), think of the 
index  as the label of a macrostate consisting of microstates ( i) whose probabilities 
pi
( )
 for a fixed value of  add up to p( ) :  
 
  p( )  pi
( )
i
 . (5) 
 
The conditional probability p
i   of the microstate i, given that it belongs to the 
macrostate , is defined by the identity 
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  pi
( )  p
i 
p( )  (6) 
 
From (4) – (6) it follows that  
 
  S pi
( )   S p( )   p( )

 S pi   . (7) 
 
That is, the statistical entropy of the probability distribution pi
( ) , often called the Gibbs 
entropy, is the sum of the coarse-grained statistical entropy S p( )   and a residual 
statistical entropy, equal to the weighted average of the statistical entropies associated 
with the microstructures of the macrostates.   
 If the microstates refer to an isolated system, the Gibbs entropy is constant in time (in 
classical statistical mechanics on account of Liouville‟s theorem, in quantum statistical 
mechanics because microstates evolve deterministically).  So if the coarse-grained 
statistical entropy increases with time, the residual statistical entropy must decrease at the 
same rate.  Gibbs proposed a suitably defined coarse-grained entropy as the “analogue” 
of thermodynamic entropy; but, as discussed below, the universal validity of this 
interpretation has been challenged. 
 
 
  2. Continuous probability distributions 
 
To apply Shannon‟s definition (4) to a continuous probability distribution {p(x)} , one 
partitions the range of x into discrete intervals  i  and sets pi  equal to the integral of 
p(x)  over  i .  The value of S({pi})  depends on how one chooses the intervals  i .  It 
increases without limit as the size of an interval shrinks to zero.    
 Boltzmann and Gibbs defined the statistical counterpart of entropy as an integral,  
 
   log p(x)  p(x)dx ,  
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where p(x) is the probability per unit phase-space volume at a point x in - or -space.  In 
effect, they partitioned phase space into cells of equal volume.  Since the value of 
log p(x) depends on how one chooses the unit of phase-space volume, the preceding 
formula does not assign a unique value to S.  Like thermodynamic entropy, statistical 
entropy in Boltzmann‟s and Gibbs‟s theories is defined only up to an additive constant.   
 However, if we divide each cell in phase space into k equal parts, the integral 
decreases by an amount log k, so the difference between the values of S for probability 
distributions defined on the same partition of phase space approaches a finite limit as the 
volume of a cell shrinks to zero.  In quantum statistical mechanics, statistical entropy, as 
defined by (4), has a well-defined zero point, because bounded systems have discrete sets 
of possible quantum states.  
 
 
  3.  Information 
 
Shannon used negative entropy (negentropy), the discrete counterpart of Boltzmann‟s H, 
as a measure of information.  In the present context it is more convenient to define the 
information I of a discrete probability distribution as the amount by which the 
distribution‟s statistical entropy S falls short of the largest value of S that is consistent 
with prescribed values for such quantities as the mean energy and the mean concentration 
of a chemical constituent [4]: 
 
  I  Smax  S  (8) 
 
This definition is convenient because, as discussed below, in cosmological contexts the 
largest allowed value of the statistical entropy per unit mass may increase with time; so 
processes that generate statistical entropy may also generate statistical information.   
 I is non-negative and vanishes when S  Smax ; a maximally random probability 
distribution has zero information.  If we interpret statistical entropy as a measure of 
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randomness or disorder, as is customary, we can interpret information as a measure of a 
deficiency of disorder, or order.  
 Like S, I is not uniquely defined for continuous probability distributions; it depends 
on how we partition the continuous space of events on which the distribution is defined 
into cells.  But once the space has been partitioned into cells, I, unlike S, approaches a 
finite limit when we divide each cell into k equal cells and let k increase indefinitely.  In 
classical statistical mechanics, acceptable phase-space grids have cells of equal phase-
space volume.  As the cell size approaches 0, I approaches a finite limit (whereas S blows 
up).   
 In quantum statistical mechanics, S and I are both well defined.  Because a region of 
phase space whose volume V is much larger than the volume v of a quantum cell (h in -
space, h
N
 in -space) contains V/v quantum states, classical and quantum estimates of I 
agree whenever the classical estimate applies. 
 Finally, follows easily from its definition that information, like statistical entropy, is 
hierarchically decomposable: 
 
  I pi
( )   I p( )   p( )

 I pi    (9) 
 
where each occurrence of I is defined by the appropriate version of (8).  The second term 
represents residual information.  The first term represent information associated with 
what Wigner, in the passage quoted at the beginning of this paper, called externally 
imposed gross constraints.  His suggestion that initial conditions are as random as the 
externally imposed gross constraints allow implies that the second term vanishes.  One 
aim of this paper is to ground this suggestion in a historical account of the initial 
conditions that define macroscopic systems and their surroundings. 
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  B.  The growth of order [4], [5] 
 
Standard accounts of the early universe assume that at the earliest times when current 
theories of elementary particles apply, the cosmic medium was a uniform, uniformly 
expanding gas containing “a great variety of particles in thermal equilibrium ...  .” 
[2, p. 528]  At these early times the relative concentrations of particle kinds and the 
distributions of particle energies were characterized by maximally random probability 
distributions.  And though the mass density and the temperature were changing rapidly, 
the rates of particle encounters and reactions were high enough to keep the relative 
concentrations of all particle species close to the equilibrium values appropriate to the 
instantaneous values of the temperature and the mass density. 
 As the universe expanded, both its rate of expansion and the rates of particle 
encounters decreased, but the latter decreased faster than the former.  As a result, some 
kinds of equilibrium ceased to prevail, and the corresponding probability distributions 
ceased to be maximally random.  For example, in the standard evolutionary scenario, 
which assumes that the cosmic microwave background is primordial, matter and radiation 
decoupled when their joint temperature fell low enough for hydrogen to recombine.  
Thereafter, the matter temperature and the radiation temperature declined at different 
rates.  So while matter-radiation interactions tended to equalize the matter and radiation 
temperatures, generating entropy in the process, the cosmic expansion drove the two 
temperatures farther apart, generating information.  Earlier, the relative concentrations of 
nuclides were frozen in when the rates of nuclear reactions became too slow relative to 
the rate of cosmic expansion to maintain their equilibrium values.  Again, competition 
between the cosmic expansion and nuclear reactions generated both entropy and 
information. 
 Local, as well as global, gravitational processes tend to disrupt thermodynamic 
equilibrium.  The first astronomical systems may have formed when the uniform 
distribution of mass and temperature became unstable against the growth of density 
fluctuations, or else when primordial density fluctuations reached critical amplitudes.
 
 But 
unlike isolated gas samples, newly formed self-gravitating systems did not settle into 
equilibrium states.  For example, a gas cloud of stellar mass has negative heat capacity: 
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its temperature rises as it loses energy through radiation.  As the cloud continues to 
radiate and contract, the disparities between its mean density and its mean temperature 
and those of and those of its surroundings steadily increase.  Within the cloud, gradients 
of temperature and mass density become progressively more marked.  In a mature star, 
nuclear reactions in the core gradually alter its chemical composition, thereby producing 
chemical inhomogeneity – another variety of disequilibrium.   
 
 
  1. Cosmology and the second law of thermodynamics 
 
I have argued that while local processes drive local conditions toward local 
thermodynamic equilibrium, the cosmic expansion and the contraction of self-gravitating 
astronomical systems drive local conditions away from local thermodynamic equilibrium, 
creating both information and entropy.  This argument raises the questions: In what 
domain is entropy defined? And in what domain is the Second Law valid?   
 In classical thermodynamics, entropy is initially defined for systems in 
thermodynamic equilibrium.  This definition is then extended to systems in local, but not 
global, thermodynamic equilibrium and to composite systems whose components are 
individually in global or local thermodynamic equilibrium.  The Boltzmann-Gibbs-
Shannon definition of statistical entropy allows us to extend the thermodynamic 
definition to any physical state defined by a probability distribution.  Can the domain in 
which the Second Law is valid be likewise extended?   
 Gibbs showed that the statistical entropy of the probability distribution of classical 
microstates that defines a macrostate of a closed system is constant in time; the same is 
true of a probability distribution of classical microstates of a closed system.  Boltzmann‟s 
H theorem extends the Second Law to arbitrary non-equilibrium states of a sample of an 
ideal gas, but his proof of the theorem assumes that the residual statistical information 
(see Eq. 7) of the probability distribution that characterizes the sample‟s macrostate 
vanishes at all times.  This assumption cannot be weakened.  It isn‟t enough to assume 
that the residual information (i.e., information associated with molecular correlations) 
vanishes initially.  Boltzmann‟s proof and Gibbs‟s proof of the constancy of a closed 
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system‟s statistical entropy show that molecular interactions do not destroy single-
particle information; they convert it into residual information; and Poincaré‟s theorem 
shows that in a closed system residual information residual information eventually makes 
its way back into single-particle information.   
 Boltzmann‟s assumption that residual statistical information is permanently absent 
exemplifies what van Kampen has called “repeated randomness assumptions.”  As 
discussed in more detail below, he argued that the H theorem exemplifies a wide class of 
theorems about stochastic processes that rely on versions of this assumption.  I argue 
below that these assumptions, when valid, are justified by historical arguments.  It 
follows that H theorems – extensions of the Second Law to macroscopic systems whose 
macrostates can be characterized by probability distributions of quantum states – are 
historical generalizations, depend on historically justified initial and boundary conditions.  
 Can the notion of entropy and the law of entropy growth be extended to self-
gravitating systems?  Consider a self-gravitating gas cloud.  We can regard a sufficiently 
small region of the cloud as a gas sample in a uniform external gravitational field, and 
conclude from the Second Law that physical processes occurring within it generate 
entropy.  If the cloud‟s large-scale structure is not changing too rapidly, we can then 
conclude that local thermodynamic equilibrium prevails.  We can, if we wish, define the 
entropy of the cloud as the sum of the entropies of its parts.  But this definition does not 
contain a gravitational contribution.  There is no consensus that such a contribution exists 
and no widely accepted view of how it might be defined if it does exist.  Presumably it 
would be non-additive, like the gravitational contribution to the cloud‟s energy.   
 The gravitational contribution to the energy of a self-gravitating cloud causes the 
cloud to behave very differently from a closed gas sample in the laboratory.  Although 
heat flow, mediated by collisions between gas molecules, tends to reduce temperature 
differences between adjacent regions, the cloud does not relax into a state of uniform 
temperature.  (Indeed, such a state doesn‟t exist for a cloud of finite mass.)   Instead, the 
cloud evolves toward a state of dynamical (quasi-)equilibrium in which the gravitational 
force acting on each element balances the resultant of the pressure forces on the 
element‟s boundary.  The virial theorem, applied to a self-gravitating system in 
dynamical equilibrium, implies that the system has negative heat capacity: its mean 
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temperature increases as the cloud loses energy through radiation.  As the cloud 
contracts, the internal gradients of temperature, density, and pressure become steeper.  
The non-gravitational contribution to the cloud‟s entropy decreases.       
 
 
  2.  Initial conditions for macroscopic systems 
 
Every observer sees the world from his or her own point of view.  An account of the 
universe and its evolution that incorporates the strong cosmological principle privileges 
none of these local perspectives.  In a sense, it includes all of them.  Yet it cannot contain 
or predict initial conditions that characterize individual physical systems, such as the Sun.  
To make such a prediction the cosmological account would have to contain a sentence 
like “Relative to a specified coordinate system, the object whose center of mass is at x at 
time t has such-and-such properties.”  But it cannot contain such a sentence, because 
there is no preferred coordinate system.  The cosmological account has no way of 
singling out individual systems. 
 On the other hand, every observer acquires information about individual systems –
information that isn‟t in the perspectiveless cosmological account.  Where does that 
information come from if it wasn‟t in the (supposedly) complete cosmological account to 
begin with?  As Szilard [8] pointed out long ago, the entropy generated by an 
observational process more than offsets the information delivered by the observation.  
Part of the process consists in converting information in information-rich fuel sources 
(batteries, ATP molecules) into qualitatively new forms (improved estimates of the Sun‟s 
mass).  So we can acquire an indefinite quantity of data that characterize the view from 
Earth.  Our description realizes one of infinitely many possible descriptions, centered on 
different points in space.  All these descriptions contain the same statistical information.  
The perspectiveless cosmological account contains only that information.  
 Every macroscopic system and its surroundings are characterized by probability 
distributions of microstate.  Such a probability distribution is determined by its history, 
which began in the early universe.  But the history of every macroscopic system also 
contains local contributions.   In particular, the history of a system on a laboratory bench 
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includes an account of how the system and its surroundings were prepared.  I will argue 
below that macroscopic systems are rarely found in definite microstates (the argument is 
due to Zeh [32]) but may be, and often are, found or prepared in definite macrostates.  




  III.  CHANCE IN THE MACROSCOPIC DOMAIN 
 
In the 1880s Poincaré
 
discovered that some orbits in self-gravitating systems are 
extremely sensitive to initial conditions.  In a popular essay published twenty years later 
[9], he
 
suggested that extreme sensitivity to initial conditions is the defining characteristic 
of what is now called deterministic chaos.  The outcomes of such processes, Poincaré 
argued, are predictable in principle but unpredictable in practice.   
 Poincaré‟s first example was a cone initially balanced on its tip.  Any external 
disturbance, no matter how small, causes the cone to topple in a direction that is 
unpredictable in practice.  The following argument suggests that even in the absence of 
external disturbances and even if we neglect Heisenberg‟s uncertainty principle, the 
direction of fall is unpredictable in principle as well as in practice.   
 Classical mechanics represents the cone‟s possible microstates by points in a four-
dimensional phase space whose coordinates are the elevation and azimuth of the cone‟s 
axis and the conjugate angular momenta.  But according to the arguments of §II, the 
cone‟s initial macrostate is represented not by a single point in this phase space but by a 
probability distribution of possible microstates.  This probability distribution must 
contain a finite quantity of information; its support must have finite phase-space volume, 
which in general will greatly exceed 
2 , the limit set by Heisenberg‟s uncertainty 
relation.  If the support includes the point that represents the initial state of unstable 
equilibrium, it contains classical phase-space trajectories that correspond to all possible 
directions of fall, and the final orientation of the axis is unpredictable in principle.  From 
a description of the experimental setup one could in principle infer the probability 
distribution of classical microstates that characterizes the cone‟s initial macrostate.  
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Classical mechanics would allow us to calculate the evolution of each microstate and 
hence to calculate the probability distribution of final microstates; and a description of 
the apparatus that records the final orientation of the cone‟s axis would allow us to 
partition this distribution into a distribution of macrostates.  As discussed below, an 
analogous schema applies to quantum measurements. 
 The probability distributions that characterize the initial states of macroscopic 
systems depend on their history.  Hence there can be no genuine laws about initial 
conditions, only historical generalizations.  For example, macroscopic systems cannot 
usually be prepared in definite quantum states; but physicists have succeeded in preparing 
superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUIDs) in superpositions of 
macroscopically distinct quantum states.  Again, macroscopic systems are usually 
microscopically disordered; but Hahn‟s spin-echo experiment showed that this is not 
necessarily the case.   
 Nevertheless, the argument of §II suggests that many natural processes have 
unpredictable outcomes.  This conclusion, if correct, would bring the physicists‟ 
worldview closer not only to the worldview of ordinary experience, in which chance 
seems to play a major role, but also to that of biology.  Chance plays a key role in 
evolution: genetic variation, which generates candidates for natural selection, has a 
random component, and the histories of individuals, populations, and species are strongly 
influenced by apparently unpredictable fluctuations in their environments.  Some 
developmental processes – the immune response, visual perception, and some learning 
strategies, for example – likewise rely on processes with unpredictable outcomes [10]. 
 
 
 A.  Equilibrium statistical mechanics 
 
Most modern presentations of classical and quantum statistical mechanics follow the 
mathematical approach pioneered by J. W. Gibbs [6], in which probability distributions 
of an undisturbed N-particle system‟s microstates represent equilibrium macrostates and 
probability-weighted averages of microscopic quantities represent thermodynamic 
variables.  Quantum statistical mechanics represents macroscopic states and variables in 
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exactly the same way.  Let the probability distribution {
k
( )
p } of quantum states k 






( ) k O k
k




  ( )  k
k




 is the value of the macroscopic variable O  in the macrostate .  We discuss the 
physical interpretation of (10) in §III.C below. 
 The statistical counterpart of entropy is statistical entropy: 
 
   S( )   pk
( ) log pk
( )
k
  (12) 
 
 Gibbs called his statistical descriptions “analogies.”  He showed that the canonical 
probability distribution, 
 
  pk  e
Ek /kT / e
E j /kT
j
 , (13) 
 
maximizes the statistical entropy, subject to the constraint that the mean energy has a 
prescribed value, represented by  the thermodynamic variable E.  The reciprocal of the 
Lagrange multiplier associated with this constraint is the absolute (Kelvin) temperature T.  
Gibbs showed that the thermodynamic identity TdS  dE PdV  obtains in the statistical 
description based on the canonical distribution.  H also showed that the statistical 
description based on the microcanonical distribution, in which the probability distribution 
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is uniform over the (6N – 1)-dimensional region of phase whose points represent 
microstates with a given energy, mimics the thermodynamic description less successfully.   
 Some authors have tried to derive statistical mechanics from mechanics.  These 
authors favor the microcanonical distribution, because they assume that an undisturbed 
macroscopic system is in a definite microstate, and hence has a definite energy.  They 
replace Gibbs‟s averages over phase space (or, in quantum statistical mechanics, 
microstates) by time averages.  Although this approach has generated interesting 
mathematics, it is limited to equilibrium statistical mechanics, and even in that context it 
relies on questionable ad hoc assumptions.   
 Other authors have sought to base statistical mechanics on an epistemic argument:  
  
[M]acroscopic observers, such as we are, are under no circumstances capable of 
observing, let alone measuring, the microscopic dynamic state of a system which 
involves the determination of an enormous number of parameters, of the order of 
10
23
. ... [Thus] a whole ensemble of possible dynamical states corresponds to the 
same macroscopic state, compatible with our knowledge. [11]   
 
 As mentioned above, Gibbs proved that the statistical entropy of the canonical 
distribution exceeds that of any other distribution with the same mean energy.  E. T. 
Jaynes
 
[12], [13] made this theorem the cornerstone of an elegant formulation of 
statistical mechanics that interprets statistical entropy as a measure of missing 
knowledge.  He argued that  “statistical mechanics [is] a form of statistical inference 
rather than a physical theory.”  Its “computational rules are an immediate consequence of 
the maximum-entropy principle,” which yields “the best estimates that could have been 
made on the basis of the information available.” [11, p. 620]  Gibbs, by contrast, 
interpreted statistical entropy not as a measure of missing knowledge – he did not identify 
the macroscopic system he was describing with a definite but unknown member of the 
ensemble that characterizes the system‟s thermodynamic state – but as an “analogue” of 
thermodynamic entropy.  In the present account, the probability distributions that 
characterize a macroscopic system and its surroundings characterize them completely and 
objectively; they have nothing to do with what we know or don‟t know about the system 
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and its surroundings; and statistical entropy is not a measure of human ignorance but of 
objective randomness.   
 Gibbs also proved that the canonical probability distribution characterizes subsystems 
of an extended isolated system characterized by a microcanonical probability distribution.  
That is, it characterizes a macroscopic system in a heat bath.  Many modern authors (e.g., 
Schrödinger [14]) justify the canonical distribution on these grounds.  The foundational 
problem then shifts its focus from the canonical (or grand canonical) distribution to the 
microcanonical distribution and becomes the problem of justifying the ergodic 
hypothesis.  
 The considerations of §II supply an objective version of Jaynes‟s maximum-entropy 
principle.  Jaynes‟s principle encapsulates the sound methodological precept that a 
scientific description of a physical system should not outrun what scientists know, or can 
know, about the system.  In the present account, the probability distribution that 
objectively characterizes a macrostate contains just the information created by the 
physical processes that shaped that macrostate.  In particular, probability distributions 
that objectively characterize equilibrium states have zero residual information.  
Consequently, Jaynes‟s methodological precept normally leads to the same statistical 
description of equilibrium states as a historical physical argument based on an 
assumption about the primordial cosmic medium.  But it can happen that an objective 
statistical description of a macrostate contains residual information that an observer is 
unaware of.  In this situation, illustrated by Hahn‟s spin-echo experiment, a prediction 
based on the maximum-entropy principle fails.   
 
 
  B.  Non-equilibrium Statistical Mechanics 
 
According to the present approach, a complete description of a macroscopic system‟s 
initial state contains just the information created by the system‟s history, including its 
method of preparation.  This supplies a framework – but only a framework – for 
addressing what Van Kampen [15] has called “the main problem in the statistical 
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mechanics of irreversible processes”:  What determines the choice of macrostates and 
macroscopic variables?   
 Van Kampen [15, 16] has also emphasized the role of “repeated randomness 
assumptions” in theories of stochastic processes: 
 
This repeated randomness assumption is drastic but indispensable whenever one 
tries to make a connection between the microscopic world and the macroscopic or 
mesoscopic levels.  It appears under the aliases “Stosszahlansatz,” “molecular 
chaos,” or “random phase approximation,” and it is responsible for the appearance 
of irreversibility.  Many attempts have been made to eliminate this assumption, 
usually amounting to hiding it under the rug of mathematical formalism. [16, p. 
58] 
 
To derive his transport equation and his H theorem, Boltzmann had to assume (following 
Maxwell) that the initial velocities of colliding molecules in a closed gas sample are 
statistically uncorrelated.  This assumption cannot hold for non-equilibrium states, 
because when the information that characterizes a non-equilibrium state decays, residual 
information associated with molecular correlations comes into being at the same rate.  
However, because a gas sample‟s reservoir of microscopic information is so large, 
molecular chaos may prevail to a good approximation for periods much shorter than the 
Poincaré recurrence time, which is typically much longer than the age of the universe.   
 Another approach to the problem of justifying repeated randomness assumptions 
starts from the remark that no gas sample is an island unto itself.  Can the fact that actual 
gas samples interact with their surroundings justify the assumption that correlation 
information is permanently absent in a nominally closed gas sample?  And if so, is it 
legitimate to appeal to environmental “intervention”?   
 Fifty years ago, J. M. Blatt [17] argued that the answer to both questions is yes.  The 
walls that contain a gas sample are neither perfectly reflecting nor perfectly stationary.  
When a gas molecule collides with a wall, its direction and its velocity acquire tiny 
random contributions.  These leave the single-particle probability distribution virtually 
unaltered, but they alter the histories of individual molecules, thereby disrupting multi-
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particle correlations.  Blatt distinguished between states of true equilibrium, characterized 
(in the vocabulary of the present paper) by an information-free probability distribution, 
and quasi-equilibrium states, in which single-particle information is absent but 
correlation (or residual) information is present.  With the help of a simple thought 
experiment, Blatt argued that collisions between molecules of a rarefied gas sample and 
the walls of its container cause an initial quasi-equilibrium state to relax into true 
equilibrium long before the gas has come into thermal equilibrium with the walls.  
 Earlier, Bergmann and Lebowitz [18] constructed and investigated detailed 
mathematical models of the relaxation from quasi-equilibrium to true equilibrium through 
external “intervention.”  More recently, Ridderbos and Redhead [19] have expanded 
Blatt‟s case for the interventionist approach.  They constructed a simple model of the 
spin-echo experiment [20], in which a macroscopically disordered state evolves into a 
macroscopically ordered state.  They argued that in this experiment (and more generally) 
interaction between a nominally isolated macroscopic system and its environment 
mediates the loss of correlation information. 
 Blatt noted that this “interventionist” approach “has not found general acceptance.” 
 
There is a common feeling that it should not be necessary to introduce the wall of 
the system in so explicit a fashion.  ... Furthermore, it is considered unacceptable 
philosophically, and somewhat “unsporting,” to introduce an explicit source of 
randomness and stochastic behavior directly into the basic equations.  Statistical 
mechanics is felt to be a part of mechanics, and as such one should be able to start 
from purely causal behavior. [17, p. 747] 
 
The historical approach sketched in this paper directly addresses these concerns.  It 
implies that statistical mechanics cannot be derived from quantum (or classical) 
microphysics, because, as discussed below, macroscopic systems cannot be idealized as 
closed systems in definite microstates.  It assumes that they can be idealized as closed 
systems in definite macrostates.  And it anchors the statistical assumptions about the 
initial states of macroscopic systems and their environments on which statistical theories 
depend in a historical narrative based on a simple cosmological assumption.   
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 Derivations of master equations that rely on decoherence ([21] and references cited 
there]) exemplify and significantly extend the interventionist approach.  These 
derivations assume (unrealistically) that macroscopic systems are initially in definite 
quantum states but also (realistically) that they interact with random environments.  
Under these conditions, environmental interactions transfer information very effectively 
from the system to its surroundings.  Microscopic information that is wicked away from 
the system disperses outward, eventually getting lost in interstellar and intergalactic 
space.    
 
 
  C.  The origin of irreversibility  
 
Because the microstates of undisturbed systems evolve reversibly, a theory that assigns 
macroscopic systems (or the universe) definite quantum states cannot provide a 
framework for theories that distinguish in an absolute sense between the two directions of 
time.  The historical approach sketched in this paper offers such a framework because by 
linking the initial states of macroscopic systems to states of the early universe it equips 
time with an arrow.  Specifically, it predicts that macroscopic systems are usually 
embedded in random environments and that their initial states usually contain only 
information associated with the values of macroscopic variables.  However, as the spin-
echo experiment shows, macroscopic systems can be prepared in states that contain 
microscopic information.    
 
 
  D.  Quantum measurements  
 
  1.  Cosmological ensembles 
 
A description of the universe that comports with the strong cosmological principle should 
not pick out any particular macroscopic system.  We therefore assume that macroscopic 
descriptions refer not to individual systems but to cosmological ensembles [4], [5] – 
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infinite collection of identical systems distributed in a statistically uniform way in space.  
We interpret the density operator  ( )  in Eq. (10) as referring to such an ensemble:  
 
Interpret the quantity Tr (( )O)  as the average value of the macroscopic variable 
O
( )
 in a cosmological ensemble.    (14) 
 
As in (10), O
( )
 is the value of O , the macroscopic counterpart of the observable O, in 
the macrostate  characterized by the density operator  ( ) . 
 Rule (14) resembles a rule given by Dirac [22, pp. 132, 133]:  
 
Identify Tr (O) with the average result of a large number of measurements of O 
when the system “is in one or other of a number of possible states according to 
some given probability law.”    (14*) 
 
Dirac‟s rule (14*) generalizes his interpretation of the matrix element s O s  as the 
average result of a large number of measurements of O when the system is in state s.  
Like the earlier rule, it treats measurement as a primitive concept.  In contrast, rules (10) 
and (14) do not mention measurement; it is trivially true that O
( )
is the result of 
measuring O  when the system is in the macrostate characterized by .   Nor do (10) and 
(14) presuppose Dirac‟s interpretation of s O s .  As discussed in §D.2, (14) allows us 
to derive this interpretation from a modified form of von Neumann‟s account of an ideal 
measurement, and thus to bring quantum measurement into the domain of quantum 
statistical mechanics.  
 The density operator  ( )  refers to a cosmological ensemble whose members are 
all in the macrostate .  Suppose  is the initial quantum state of Poincaré‟s cone, 
whose axis is as nearly vertical and as nearly stationary as Heisenberg‟s uncertainty 
relations allow.  If the cone is undisturbed, its microstates evolve deterministically, 
Initial conditions in cosmology and statistical physics Layzer 
 27 
and the density operator that represents its macrostate evolves into a density operator 





 pk( ) k


 p( ) k
k





(As earlier, k  denotes the kth microstate of the macrostate of the macrostate , pk
( )  
denotes the probability of the microstate k , p
k 
 pk
( ) / p( ) , and p( )  p
k 
k
 .)  
Then 
 






  p( )O
( )

  (16) 
 
By (14), this is the ensemble average of the macroscopic counterpart of the observable O.  
In particular, if P is the projector  
 
  P  k
k
 k , (17) 
 
  Tr (P )  p
( )  (18) 
 
Since P  takes the value 1 in microstates that belong to the macrostate   and the value 0 
in microstates that belong to other macrostates that figure in the definition (15) of  , 
Tr (P )  is the fraction of ensemble members in the macrostate  .  Eq. (18) says that 
this fraction is p
( )
.   
 Thus the ensemble interpretation accounts for the kind of macroscopic indeterminacy 
exemplified by Poincaré‟s thought experiment:  To avoid giving special standing to a 
particular cone, and hence to its position in the universe, we think of it as a member of a 
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cosmological ensemble.  If the probability distribution of microstates that defines the 
cone‟s initial macrostate does not contain enough information to predict its final 
macrostate (defined by the orientation of the cone‟s axis), it evolves (deterministically) 
into a probability distribution that can be partitioned into sub-distributions that represent 
macroscopically distinguishable macrostates.  A complete description of the experimental 
setup would allow one to assign a probability to each of these macrostates.  This 
probability is its relative frequency in a cosmological ensemble.  The outcome at a 
particular place is unpredictable because all members of a cosmological ensemble are on 
the same footing. 
 
 
  2.  Quantum measurements 
 
Von Neumann‟s account of an ideal measurement [23] assumes that the combined system 
(measured object + measuring apparatus) is initially in a definite quantum state; that 
Schrödinger‟s equation governs the evolution of this state during a measurement; and that 
if the object is initially in an eigenstate of the measured observable, the measurement 
leaves it in that state.  It follows from these assumptions that if the object is initially in a 
superposition of eigenstates of the measured observable, the final microstates of the 
combined system are superpositions of macroscopically distinguishable microstates, each 
associated with one of the measurement‟s possible outcomes (as predicted by the 
standard interpretation rule).  These assumptions define an ideal measurement – or, more 
precisely, a “premeasurement,” which is followed by a collapse of the superposition onto 
one of its components.   
 In a historical account of cosmic structure and evolution that comports with the strong 
cosmological principle, macroscopic systems cannot in general be idealized as being in 
definite quantum states.  They can, however, be idealized as being in definite 
macrostates.  The macrostate of a macroscopic system, such as a measuring apparatus, is 
defined by a probability distribution of microstates, which is determined by the system‟s 
history.  Because the history of a macroscopic system stretches back to the early universe, 
the probability distribution that defines its macrostate contains only the information 
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created by the information-generating processes, including experimental preparation, that 
the system has undergone.  In general, the information that characterizes the initial state 
of a measuring apparatus is that associated with the apparatus‟s specifications.  Now, 
quantum mechanics does not specify the phases of individual microstates.  So if a 
macroscopic system‟s history has not created information about the relative phases of the 
microstates that belong to its macrostate, as will always be the case for a measuring 
apparatus, a complete description of the macrostate will contain no information about 
relative phases.  They will be random.   
 Decoherence calculations, by contrast, begin by assuming, with von Neumann, that 
the combined system is in a definite quantum state.  Interaction between the combined 
system (S+M) and an environment E that is assumed to be random transfers relative-
phase information from the superposition that would represent the state of S+M in the 
absence of environmental interaction to the superposition that represents the state of 
S+M+E.   
 Suppose then that the measuring apparatus is initially in a definite macrostate, 
characterized by a probability distribution { pi } of quantum states i M .  Assume that the 
initial state of the measured system S is a superposition, with coefficients ck , of 
eigenstates k
S
 of an observable K.  As in von Neumann‟s account, a measurement of K 
produces an entangled quantum state of the combined system: 
 









 ck k S
k
 j(k,i) M  ck k, j(k,i)
k
  (19) 
 
Here j(k,i)  labels a quantum state of the measuring apparatus.  The argument k indicates 
that it is correlated to the eigenvalue k of the system S.  
 Let O denote an observable that refers to the combined system S + M.  By (14), the 
ensemble average of the macroscopic counterpart of the observable O in the final state is: 
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Tr (O)  pi
i


























 c k ck k , j( k ,i)
k ,k
 O k, j(k,i)
 (20) 
 
Now, as Bohr emphasized (and experimental practice confirms), states of the measuring 
apparatus are classical states, completely specified by the values of classical variables; a 
complete description of the probability distribution pi  that characterizes the measuring 
apparatus‟s initial state therefore contains no information about the relative phases of the 
quantum states i.  As Bohm [22] pointed out long ago, they have random phases.  What 
about the relative phases of quantum states j(k, i)
M
, j( k , i)
M
 belonging to different 
pointer states k, k  of the measured observable?  Decoherence theory shows that 
interaction between a macroscopic system and a random environment randomizes the 
relative phases of such states on very short time scales.  Consequently the relative phases 
of off-diagonal matrix elements k , j( k ,i) O k, j(k,i)  are randomly distributed between 
0 and 2.  Since the number of microstates i >> 1, the result of averaging 




 k , j( k ,i) O k, j(k,i)  0   ( k  k ) (21) 
 
















where (k, k) labels the macrostate of the combined system in which the object is in the 
quantum state k and the apparatus is in the correlated pointer state. 
 As in the discussion following Eq. (16), we conclude that in each member of the 
cosmological ensemble of combined systems that represents the outcome of the 
measurement, the object is in an eigenstate of the measured observable and the apparatus 
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is in the correlated pointer state.  Moreover, the fraction of ensemble members in the state 
(k, k) is ck
2
, as Born‟s rule prescribes. 
 
 
  2a)  Quantum measurements generate coarse-grained entropy.   
 
In the preceding description of an ideal measurement, the same probability distribution 
pi  of microstates characterizes the initial and final states of the combined system, so 
its statistical entropy (the Gibbs entropy) doesn‟t change.  But the coarse-grained entropy 
associated with the probability distribution of macrostates of the combined system 






.   This gain is compensated by an equal 
loss of residual entropy.  The loss of residual statistical entropy results mainly from the 
fact that the preceding idealized account allots fewer microstates to each of the final 
macrostates than to the initial macrostate.  For example, if the initial macrostate contains 
n microstates, with n ? 1, its statistical entropy is approximately log n.  In the final state, 
the n microstates are distributed among the final macrostates; so their residual entropy is 
approximately pa logn

 , wheren  pn .   The total (fine-grained) statistical entropy 
of the final probability distribution is thus  pa log pa 

 p( ) logn

  logn .    
 
  2b) Decoherence and measurement   
 
Many previous attempts to apply quantum mechanics to the measurement process have 
implicitly or explicitly invoked the cancellation of matrix elements that connect 
macroscopically distinguishable quantum states in sums like (20).  For example, Bohm 
[22] argued that in an idealized Stern-Gerlach experiment, the conditions for a good 
measurement require the phase of the silver atom‟s center-of-mass wave function to vary 
by an amount much greater than 2π over each region of the detector where the amplitude 
of the wave function is appreciable.  Decoherence theory shows how interaction between 
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a measuring apparatus and a random (internal or external) environment in effect 
randomizes the relative phases of quantum states belonging to different pointer states.  It 
also supplies estimates of decoherence times for particular models.  The preceding 
account of measurement appeals to the same process at a crucial step in the argument, the 
step leading to (21). 
 The preceding account supplements (and differs from) accounts based on 
decoherence in four significant ways: 
 (i)  Decoherence theory applies Schrödinger‟s equation to an undisturbed system 
consisting of the measured system, the measuring apparatus, and a portion of the 
environment.  In the present account the measuring apparatus is initially in a definite 
classical state, characterized by a historically defined probability distribution of quantum 
states. 
 (ii) Decoherence theory postulates that the (external or internal) environment has a 
random character.  This is a crucial assumption.  Its operational meaning is clear, but its 
physical meaning in the context of measurement theory and, more generally, in quantum 
statistical mechanics, is unclear.  In the present account randomness has a definite and 
objective meaning: in a particular context it is measured by the statistical entropy of a 
probability distribution “descended” from the probability distributions that (objectively) 
characterize the primordial cosmic medium.   
 (iii) Because the present account explains environmental randomness, it predicts that 
quantum measurements are irreversible. 
 (iv) Decoherence theory explains why local measurements cannot exhibit the effects 
of interference between macroscopically distinguishable quantum states.  But, as Joos 
and Zeh emphasized in a seminal paper,   
 
The use of the local density matrix allows at most only a partial derivation of classical 
concepts for two reasons: it already assumes a local description, and it presupposes 
the probabilistic interpretation leading to the collapse of the state vector at some stage 
of a measurement. ... The difficulties in giving a complete derivation of classical 
concepts may as well signal the need for entirely novel concepts [25].  
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In particular, decoherence theory does not solve what Schlosshauer [21] calls “the 
problem of outcomes;” it does not predict that measurements have definite outcomes.  
The present account does make this prediction.  In a sense it also explains why quantum 
measurements have indeterminate outcomes: a complete description of the universe that 
comports with the strong cosmological principle cannot tell us where a measurement 
outcome occurs.   
 
 
  E.  Quantum measurements and general relativity  
 
A quantum measurement can result in an unpredictable change in the local structure of 





This has been said to demonstrate the need for “treating the spacetime metric in a 
probabilistic fashion – i.e., [for] quantizing the gravitational field ...” [26]   
 Now the preceding account of a quantum measurement does not predict where each 
of the possible outcomes of a quantum measurement occurs.  Instead it predicts what 
fraction of the membership of a cosmological ensemble experiences each possible 
outcome.   
 The present description of the cosmic medium (§II) is likewise probabilistic.  
Although the stress-energy tensor is a classical field, it is also a realization – indeed the 
realization – of a probabilistic description that does not privilege any position or direction 
in space.  The indeterminacy of quantum measurement outcomes is consistent with this 
probabilistic description of the structure and contents of spacetime.  We cannot predict 
the outcome of a quantum measurement because we cannot know where, in an absolute 
sense, it occurs.  The structure of spacetime after a measurement has taken place reflects 
                                                 
1
 Such a displacement affects the structure of spacetime only locally, because it does not 
change the center of mass of the self-gravitating system in which the measurement 
occurs.  Its effects therefore diminish rapidly with distance and are eventually lost in the 
noise associated with random fluctuations in the mass density of the universe.    
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the fact that a measurement has occurred but supplies no information about where it has 
occurred. 
 There are, of course, strong reasons for seeking a quantum theory of gravity.  The 
preceding argument merely shows that if the historical account of initial conditions 
sketched in the preceding pages is correct, quantum mechanics and general relativity do 
not actually clash in the domain where they both hold, at least to an excellent 
approximation.  The reason is that contact between them is mediated by statistical 
macrophysics, whose assumptions, as I have argued, are anchored in an account of 
cosmic evolution.   
 
 
  IV.  THE INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS  
 
Classical physics extends and refines intuitive and commonsense notions about the 
external world.  As Dirac [22, preface to the first edition, 1930] pointed out, the 
formalism of quantum mechanics describes a mathematical world we can neither picture 
nor adequately translate into ordinary language.  How is that world related to the world 
that classical physics describes?  Although this question falls outside the domain of 
physics as such, an acceptable answer must comport with the rule that links the 
mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics to the results of possible measurements.  
And different versions of this rule have suggested different answers.   
 Dirac‟s version of the rule identifies the matrix element s O s with the average 
result of a large number of measurements of an observable O when the measured system 
is in the state s.  It is unambiguous, and it has proved adequate for all practical purposes.  
However, Dirac‟s exposition of quantum mechanics stops short of describing the 
measurement process itself.   
 Von Neumann‟s theory of measurement attempted to fill this gap.  Von Neumann laid 
down necessary conditions for an ideal measurement.  Assuming that the combined 
system is undisturbed and is initially in a definite quantum state, he concluded that the 
combined system evolves into a superposition of macroscopically distinguishable states, 
each of which represents one of the measurement‟s possible outcomes.  To reconcile this 
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result with Dirac‟s rule (and with experiment), he postulated that the predicted 
superposition promptly collapses onto one of its components. 
 Some attempts to avoid the need for such a postulate without altering the theory‟s 
formal structure appeal to methodological or philosophical considerations.  Some 
prominent examples: 
 – Heisenberg [25] argued that state vectors do not describe objective physical states. 
Instead they describe a “potential reality” which measurements “actualize.”  Some 
contemporary physicists – for example, Gottfried and Yan [28, pp. 40, 574] – have 
embraced this view.  
 – Wigner [29] argued that “the function of quantum mechanics is not to describe 
„reality,‟ whatever this term means, but only to furnish statistical correlations between 
subsequent observations.  This assessment reduces the state vector to a calculational 
tool ...”  Peres [30] agreed: “In fact, there is no evidence whatsoever that every physical 
system has at every instant a well defined state [whose] time dependence represents the 
actual evolution of a physical process.”   
 – Everett [31] hypothesized that the universe is in a definite quantum state whose 
evolution is governed by Schrödinger‟s equation (or a linear generalization thereof).  
Every quantum measurement then creates a non-collapsing superposition of equally real 
quantum states.  Proponents of this approach hope that the world of classical physics and 
experience will fit into this proliferating tree-like structure of universe-states, but they 
have not yet succeeded in showing precisely how.    
 – Zeh [30] argued that the quantum states of macroscopic systems, including the 
combined system in a quantum measurement, are invariably entangled with states of their 
environment.  He argued that macroscopic systems, including large molecules, acquire 
classical properties through their interaction with a random environment, a process later 
dubbed “decoherence.”  Diverse theories that rely on this process [33] assume that 
quantum mechanics applies to macroscopic systems, including measuring apparatuses 
and their immediate environment, but not necessarily to the universe as a whole.  Such 
theories explain why interference effects between macroscopically distinguishable states 
of a macroscopic system initially in a definite quantum state quickly become 
unobservable.  They also explain the observed absence of transitions between 
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macroscopically distinguishable states of large molecules (superselection rules) [30].  But 
they do no explain why quantum measurements have definite outcomes.   
 – Zurek [34], one of the founders of decoherence theory, has argued that quantum 
mechanics needs a cosmological postulate, namely, that “the universe consists of 
quantum systems, and ... that a composite system can be described by a tensor product of 
the Hilbert spaces of the constituent systems.”  Decoherence-based theories also need to 
assume that macroscopic systems are embedded in random environments.  An account of 
cosmic evolution along the lines sketched  in this paper would supply these needs. 
 In this paper I have argued that classical physics is neither a province nor a 
presupposition of quantum mechanics.  Systems governed by classical laws are 
distinguished from systems governed by quantum laws by their histories, which 
determine the initial conditions that define them.  These initial conditions take the form 
of probability distributions of quantum states.  Probability distributions that assign 
comparable probabilities to a very large number of quantum states (i.e., probability 
distributions with broad support in Hilbert space) characterize systems governed by 
classical laws.  Quantum laws govern systems to which one can assign a definite 
quantum state.  Thus quantum physics and classical physics correspond to limiting cases 
of the historically determined initial conditions that define physical systems.  
 What is distinctive about this characterization of macroscopic states is not its 
mathematical form, which is old and familiar, but the interpretation of the probability 
distributions of quantum states that figure in it.  I have argued that these probability 
distributions are descended from probability distributions that objectively describe states 
of the early universe; and that, in virtue of the strong cosmological principle, they belong 
to an objective description of the universe and its evolution.  This interpretation offers an 
objective answer to van Kampen‟s “fundamental question: How is it possible that such 
macroscopic behavior exists, governed by its own equations of motion, regardless of the 
details of the microscopic motion?” [16, p. 56]  It also offers an objective interpretation 
of quantum indeterminacy that contrasts with Heisenberg‟s view that the unpredictability 
of quantum-measurement outcomes results from “uncertainties concerning the 
microscopic structure of the [measuring] apparatus ... and, since the apparatus is 
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connected with the rest of the world, of the microscopic structure of the whole world.” 
[25, pp. 53-4, my italics] 
 Mainstream interpretations of current physical theories offer a picture of the physical 
world in which the outcomes of physical processes other than quantum measurements 
and measurement-like processes are predictable in principle.  The same physical theories, 
interpreted in light of the strong cosmological principle, suggest a qualitatively different 
picture of the physical world: one in which indeterminacy obtains at all levels of 
description.  In this picture the universe itself is the unique realization of a statistical 
description that initially contains little or no statistical information.  Gravitational 
processes – the cosmic expansion, the growth of density fluctuations in the cosmic 
medium, the contraction of self-gravitating systems – subsequently create statistical 
information, but the statistical information per unit mass remains far smaller than its 
largest possible value.  Thus, as interventionist statistical theories of irreversibility and 
decoherence theories of the quantum-to-classical transition assume, the structure of the 
universe is orderly on macroscopic scales but random on microscopic scales.  And 
because the initial states of macroscopic systems usually (though not necessarily and not 
always) contain little or no microscopic information, we can expect the outcomes of 
processes that depend sensitively on initial conditions to be objectively unpredictable in 
many cases.   
 The historical account of initial conditions sketched in this paper connects the 
physical laws that prevail at different levels of description but establishes no clear order 
of precedence among them.  The strong cosmological principle is the source of 
indeterminacy at the macroscopic and astronomical levels, but it presupposes quantum 
mechanics.  The strong cosmological principle also enables general relativity‟s classical 
description of spacetime in the large to coexist peaceably with quantum indeterminacy 
(§III.E).  Macroscopic laws of motion, which involve a small number of macroscopic 
variables, depend on cosmology, because macroscopic systems are defined by probability 
distributions that contain little or no microscopic information and are rooted in the 
probability distributions that characterize the early universe.  At the same time, the 
predictions of macroscopic laws depend on the fact that quantum laws govern the 
microstructure of macroscopic systems.   
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 The interconnectedness of the three levels of description allows macroscopic 
measuring devices to probe all three levels.  But measurement does not play a privileged 
role in the present description.  Nor does this description refer, implicitly or explicitly, to 
human knowledge.  Thus although it assigns a central role to chance, it is consistent with 
Planck‟s and Einstein‟s view that physical theories describe observer-independent 
mathematical regularities behind the phenomena.  
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